26.10.11
Liquid Death
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General: No Cutting to Guard End Strength
The Army is going to cut brigade combat teams as part of a plan to shrink the force by 50,000 soldiers, but one of the engineers behind the process says the Guard is not a target.
The Air National Guard may not be so lucky, however.
Maj. Gen. Anthony Ierardi, head of Force Management, Headquarters Army, told Defense News that the reserve component is too valuable to cut as the Army attempts to fall from 570,000 to 520,000 troops.
"There are not reductions in the end strength of the National Guard or Reserve at this point of the analysis," Ierardi told the publication in a story Monday.
"I would say that generally speaking, as the active component comes down, our reliance on the reserve component will be equal if not more important than it has been," he said.
No decision has been made regarding the cutting of the Army's 73 brigade combat teams, but the publication says analysts expect 10 to 15 to disappear.
Ierardi said the Army is looking at whether to cut Stryker, heavy or infantry brigade combat teams.
Meanwhile, word is spreading that the Air Force is considering retirement of a substantial number of Air Guard aircraft. During a recent hearing by the House Armed Services Committee's tactical air land subcommittee, Rep. Mark Critz, D-Pa., said he had "just learned" that the Air Force may retire all Guard C-5As, three F-16 wings and some C-130s and A-10s.
Lt. Gen. Harry "Bud" Wyatt III, the Air Guard director, told the congressman that it was too soon to make any conclusions, but added that if those aircraft are removed, "you would have the air being taken out of the Air National Guard."
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24.10.11
What Evil Lurks In The Wagadou Forest
Two years ago Al Qaeda has proclaimed the formation of a new chapter south of Algeria, among tribal rebels and disaffected urbanites in Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania. This was more PR than reality. There are some Islamic terrorists in the region, and these pronouncements appear to be an attempt to unify pro-Islamic terrorist elements via the Internet and the mass media. So far, the many disaffected groups in the region have shown little interest in uniting. Too many different objectives and al Qaeda has a reputation for being a loser.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20111024.aspx
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Unfit For Duty
New recruits present another problem. Bad diet and lack of exercise has become a major problem with American children over the last two decades. Thus the army is getting recruits who are chubbier and less fit (low bone density and iron levels) than ever before. This results in more injuries during training, and while in combat. These troops are more prone to suffer physical injuries that will make them unfit for overseas service.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20111024.aspx
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Syrian Security Forces Coming Apart
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/pothot/articles/20111024.aspx
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Did You Know Feds Will Temporarily Cut Off All TV and Radio Broadcasts on Nov. 9?
If you have ever wondered about the government's ability to control the civilian airwaves, you will have your answer on November 9th.
On that day, federal authorities are going to shut off all television and radio communications simultaneously at 2:00PM EST to complete the first ever test of the national Emergency Alert System (EAS).
This isn't a wild conspiracy theory. The upcoming test is posted on the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau website.
Only the President has the authority to activate EAS at the national level, and he has delegated that authority to the Director of FEMA. The test will be conducted jointly by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through FEMA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS).
In essence, the authority to seize control of all television and civilian communication has been asserted by the executive branch and handed to a government agency.
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23.10.11
Behind The Iron Mask In China
Then there's the other view, usually obtained over drinks with Chinese, Japanese, South Korean or Taiwanese businessmen. All of these guys have experience with Chinese industry, and often some direct knowledge of military industries. All tell the same story. Chinese military procurement is as corrupt as they come, and the wonder weapons are much more impressive on paper than they are in reality. Western military people, especially those in the navy (who see their Chinese counterparts up close), or military intelligence (who collect all sorts of inside information on the Chinese armed forces) also tell the same story. The bottom line is that the Chinese military is much less than it appears to be, and it's been that way for a long time.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20111023.aspx
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22.10.11
Monster Prediction From BofA: Another US Debt Downgrade Is Coming In Just A Few Weeks
http://www.businessinsider.com/huge-prediction-from-bofa-another-us-debt-downgrade-is-coming-in-just-a-few-weeks-2011-10
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Deal With The Devil
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/israel/articles/20111019.aspx
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The Heavy Cost Of The Arab Spring
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20111020.aspx
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Why Islamic Radicals Love Facebook
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20111021.aspx
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We Are Serious This Time, Really We Are
The U.S. constantly points to the continuing presence of Islamic terror groups in Pakistani sanctuaries. That is difficult for the Pakistanis to deny. The major danger here is that if a big attack is made in the United States, and tracked back to a Pakistani sanctuary, this could trigger a public call for war with Pakistan. Even many senior Pakistanis recognize this danger and try to control the terrorists they host. This precarious situation won't go away as long as the terrorist sanctuaries (mainly North Waziristan and Quetta) are openly protected by Pakistani leaders. But without admitting anything to the Americans, Pakistan has apparently ordered some Haqqani personnel and bases out of North Waziristan. This might just be Haqqani fleeing an area that American intelligence knew too well, and that might have been under the advice of Pakistani intelligence. The movement of Haqqani personnel, to Afghanistan or elsewhere in the tribal territories, is making life difficult for the many foreign terrorists who find sanctuary (and work) with Haqqani. The desire to impose greater security on the new Haqqani bases means foreign recruits will take a lot longer to be led in.
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/india/articles/20111021.aspx
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20.10.11
Prosperity Returns To Southern Afghanistan
Farmers knew that the shortage would create more demand, and higher prices, this year, and the area planted with poppies increased about six percent. The drought conditions of last year were eased by heavier rains, and the crop disease abated. So yield per hectare (2.5 acres) increased by over 50 percent. This should have saturated the market, but it didn't. That's because NATO raids on drug gang operations destroyed tons of opium and refined heroin in the last year. The gangs had customers demanding product, so, despite the much larger supply, the price farmers got for their opium still went up over 40 percent. Income for poppy farmers has more than doubled.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20111019.aspx
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18.10.11
Redistribution of Poverty
A conjecture: Perhaps the answer to poverty has been, and remains, the attempt, that has nowhere been so successful or pervasive as in the United States, where as an Afghan boy pointed out to me on my last deployment, even the poor people are fat, to raise the standards and condition of all people.
An observation: Certainly there will always be those who live at the bottom of the distribution curve and many through no fault of their own. It is on the treatment such people receive from the better-off that those who have more will be judged one day, unless that treatment becomes mandatory, in which case its not laudable, not noble--it just...is, and no basis for determining the virtue of the "donor." Voluntary giving is virtue. Mandatory giving is theft, however well-intentioned.
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16.10.11
Something For The Archeologists
The current version of Marsden Mats is called PSP (Perforated Steel Planking) and comes in three meter (10 foot) long, 38cm (15 inches), 20 kg (66 pound) panels. PSP can handle heavier loads, but not heavy bombers like the B-1/2/52.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htcbtsp/articles/20111016.aspx
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15.10.11
Bad Boys And Indians
Most of the violence is along the southern border and the eastern one with Venezuela. But people in "pacified" areas are demanding some attention be paid to all the bad guys that have gone from leftist rebellion and drug production to being local thugs.
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/colombi/articles/20111014.aspx
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14.10.11
An excellent example...
Geoffrey R. Stone at the Huffington Post begins by erecting a few mirrors:
To fully understand the practical importance of New York Times v. Sullivan, it is important to consider the historical context. At the time of the decision, the South was in the throes of the civil rights movement. Southerners were deeply concerned about public opinion in the rest of country. The more the national media covered civil rights protests in the South, the more public opinion turned against those who were seeking to preserve segregation. Strategic lawsuits for libel brought by public officials against the national media for technical misstatements in news reports about civil rights protests were intended to deter the national media from covering the civil rights movement. This strategy was made especially effective because Southern juries were inclined to grant excessive damage awards against those who were embarrassing the South. In 1964, there were many similar actions pending against the New York Times in the South. The Supreme Court was acutely aware of this state of affairs, and that awareness no doubt led the justices to give the case the attention it deserved.
The historical context is always interesting and needs to be understood, as a matter of history. But in a courtroom, it should actually play little or no role. That is, if we believe in such things as equal protection under the law and judicial restraint. To achieve that, principles must be staked out and adhered to without regard to the persons, places or times. The point of this is not to give the reader any necessary information required to understand the case, but to invite the reader to join the Warren court in its justification for not upholding principles in order to serve the "needs" of the time.
Then for the smoke, he focuses on an error of fact in Justice Scalia's statement. The Justice refers to New York law and the New York legislature in describing why he believes the finding of the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan was incorrect. The case was in regards to Alabama law. Knowing that, one simply need substitute "Alabama" for "New York" in the statement in order to get the actual point.
New York Times v. Sullivan just cast [the traditional common law of libel] aside because the Court thought in modern society, it'd be a good idea if the press could say a lot of stuff about public figures without having to worry. And that may be correct, that may be right, but if it was right it should have been adopted by the people. It should have been debated in the New York Legislature and the New York Legislature could have said, 'Yes, we're going to change our libel law.' But the living constitutionalists on the Supreme Court, the Warren Court, simply decided, 'Yes, it used to be that ... George Washington could sue somebody that libeled him, but we don't think that's a good idea any more.'
But the actual point is not what interests Mr. Stone.
He then takes that last statement and uses it to justify the Warren Court's finding. Understand this; an error in the statement of the facts, and an apprehension of that that may or may not be willful, can be used to justify a decision 47 years after the fact?In Justice Scalia's view, then, the critical question is whether the Framers of the First Amendment at the time understood the provision as embracing the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan. If not - and clearly they did not understand the Amendment in that way in 1790 - then that ends the matter. The Constitution has nothing to say about the issue in New York Times v. Sullivan and it's up to the people of New York to change their law, if they want to do so.
There are many things wrong with this argument, and with originalism generally, ..., but I want to focus on one point in particular. Justice Scalia suggests that the solution to the problem in New York Times was for the New York legislature to change its libel law. But the New York legislature had absolutely nothing to do with this situation. This was a lawsuit in Alabama, decided under Alabama law by an Alabama jury. The New York legislature was completely powerless to affect the matter in any way.
It was precisely this fact that made a constitutional decision necessary. It's bad enough that Alabama wants to censor what its own citizens can read, but what the situation in New York Times v. Sullivan demonstrated was that the nation cannot constitutionally allow each state to censor speech on its own, because in a national marketplace of ideas censorship in one state effectively precludes the press from distributing news to people nationally. Although only a few hundred copies of that issue of the New York Times actually found their way into Alabama, that gave Alabama sufficient leverage to impose a huge penalty on the Times that was designed to deter it from writing negative stories about the South generally.
But all of that completely aside, the most egregious error in Stones' analysis, is the deliberate misstatement of J. Scalia's position on the matter. Despite accurately quoting the Justice above; "New York Times v. Sullivan just cast [the traditional common law of libel] aside because the Court thought in modern society, it'd be a good idea if the press could say a lot of stuff about public figures without having to worry. And that may be correct, that may be right, but if it was right it should have been adopted by the people,"
In Justice Scalia's world, the New York legislature could do nothing to protect the right of its citizens to be informed, the national government could do nothing to protect the New York Times (and all other national news outlets) from such censorship, and as a result citizens throughout the nation would have their capacity to learn and to understand their own nation squelched by the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court in New York Times quite correctly concluded that such an outcome was profoundly inconsistent with what the Framers of the First Amendment had in mind.
Nowhere did J. Scalia say that the legislature (of whichever state) could do nothing. Only that they had done nothing. The Justice also never states any opinion as to hwo he, if writing for the court in 1964, would have found--he may have found an argument that would have been judicially correct and still achieved the same or similar result, he may have dissented, or abstained. Stone, unjustifiably, presumes the dissent.
In order to avoid Stone's primary and most visible error, again, we have to replace "New York" with "Alabama." This makes the statement false on it's face (ignoring also that this legislative action would protect the rights of citizens to be misinformed albeit with regard to "technical misstatements") even if 1964 Alabama would likely have been loathe to take such legislative steps--and that's the crux of the Warren Court's justification--to act legislatively where the legislature would not and the conclusion that Mr. Stone really wants us to accept.
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45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team Unit Helping Clearing Sangar Valley of Insurgents and Bomb Making Materials
More than 600 soldiers, including several Oklahoma National Guard troops, recently made another big push to secure the Laghman Province's Sangar Valley. The troops were tasked with locating insurgents, weapons caches, and material used to make homemade explosives.
The successful joint operation included soldiers from 1st Brigade, 201st Corp, Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Oklahoma National Guard's 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team.
While U.S. and Afghan forces faced some resistance in the mountains surrounding the Sangar Valley, no friendly forces were injured during the engagements with the enemy.
Part of the mission was to demonstrate to the Afghan population the viability of the Afghan National Army.
"We are trying to disrupt insurgent activities in the Sangar Valley," said Capt. Morgan Ashworth, commander of Company C., 1st Battalion, 179 Infantry, a 45th IBCT unit, based in Edmond, Okla. "The ANA is increasing their interaction with the people, showing the people that their forces can protect them and they know how to conduct large scale operations like these against their enemies." To help secure the confidence of villagers in the valley, an Afghan led patrol base was set up nearby to provide a quicker response to insurgent activity.
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A War Like No Other
During the last decade, about eight million American served in the armed forces, about the same number that served during the eight year Vietnam War. But twice as many troops served in a combat zone during Vietnam, and more than nine times as many troops were killed. Five times as many Americans were killed in Vietnam, if you count the civilian dead lost on September 11, 2001. But the big difference was that more people went to war during Vietnam, and many more were killed. Thus during Vietnam, about 1.2 percent of Americans served in the combat zone, compared to about .5 percent during the War On Terror.
World War II was much more different still, with six percent of Americans serving in a combat zone. Over all, during World War II four percent of the eight million men and women who served overseas were killed in action (291,557), .7 percent died from other causes, such as accidents and disease (113,842). In Vietnam, 1.8 percent of those in the combat zone died, while during the War On Terror, one half of one percent of those in the combat zone died.
But there was a downside to the lower death rate during the War On Terror. It meant that more troops spent more time in combat. During World War II, most troops spent less than a year in combat. While the war had been going on since 1939, most American troops did not get into combat until June 1944, and the war in Europe was over by the following May. The fighting in the Pacific was more sporadic, with many months of no contact between periods of intense combat. In Vietnam (and Korea) there was a 13 month "tour of duty" policy, and most troops served only one tour. But during the War On Terror, multiple tours were more common, because, unlike Korea and Vietnam, there were no conscripts. All the troops were volunteers, and most served at least two tours. This increased the incidence of combat fatigue (to PTSD, for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder).
The War On Terror is not a unique experience in American military history. Several multi-decade conflicts against irregulars have occurred in the past (Haiti in the early 20th century and the Indian Wars of the late 19th century, for example). Both of these conflicts resulted in lower American (and enemy) casualties than the War On Terror. The religious radical angle was absent in these earlier wars, which is why there have been more deaths in the War On Terror. But as with those earlier conflicts, U.S. troops developed new weapons and tactics to deal with the situation. It should be noted that, although the U.S. Marines were in Haiti for nearly 30 years (from 1914), the country still reverted to dictatorship and poverty when the marines left. This exposes a truth that many refuse to acknowledge. Fixing countries isn't easy. The "civil society" that we in the West take for granted, cannot just be conjured up. The harmonious relationships that enable some democracies to work, are not a given. Those relationships often require a lot of bad habits to be changed. This is not easy. Just check a history book. Winning wars is a lot easier than making lasting change is dysfunctional cultures.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/articles/20111013.aspx
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The Swarming Of The Combat Aviation Brigades
Even with the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, a record number of CABs are staying overseas. That's because helicopters are more vital, and numerous, in Afghanistan than in Iraq. There are only about 60 percent as many U.S. troops in Afghanistan, compared to peak strength in Iraq. Thus from last year to 2014, about a third of the CABs will be overseas at one time. That's fifty percent more than in the last few years. To help support that, two additional CABs were formed in the last year. One was assembled from existing helicopters not assigned to CABs, and is already in service. The other one is being built from scratch, and will be ready by the end of the year. Forming these two new CABs cost $6.6 billion. In addition to this, hundreds of heavy (1.5 ton Sky Warrior) UAVs are being added to the CABs. The army is also reorganizing the CABs, which currently come in three types; light, medium and heavy, into "Full Spectrum" units that contain a mix of different helicopter types.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20111013.aspx
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12.10.11
Feet On Fire
But for most of this year, there was only one choice. Earlier this year, the U.S. Army selected the Belleville 950 Combat Mountain Hiker as the new combat boot for troops in Afghanistan. The Belleville 950 has a stiffer and 20 percent thicker sole, designed to ease foot strain, and increase traction for troops crossing broken (often rocky) terrain while carrying typical heavy combat loads (over 30 kg/66 pounds). The upper portion of the Belleville 950 is water resistant leather. The Belleville 950 is not suitable for full time use, because of the stiffness. So troops will continue to use their current, less stiff and more padded, combat boots. But when they are heading out into the hills, they were to wear their Belleville 950s.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/20111012.aspx
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10.10.11
USS George Washington Gains Attn as Possible Budget Casualty
A report in Defense News last week, citing anonymous sources, said naval officials are considering decommissioning the nuclear aircraft carrier decades before the end of its scheduled lifespan.
That's the second time in a week the 25-year-old behemoth has been mentioned as a potential fiscal casualty. In budget analysis released Tuesday, officials from the Center for New American Security, a Washington, D.C., think tank with close ties to President Obama, listed the early decommissioning of the ship as a way to save up to $7 billion over the next decade.
Navy officials refused to directly comment on the idea.
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Explosive Career Opportunities In Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, during June, July and August a record number of IEDs (improvised explosive devices, usually roadside bombs) were used by the drug gangs, the Taliban and other Islamic terrorists against U.S. troops. These caused 1,297 casualties (4.9 percent of them fatal). It took 5,088 IEDs to cause those casualties, which means it took 76 IEDs to kill one U.S. soldier or marine, or 3.9 IEDs to cause one casualty. Last year it took three IEDs to cause one casualty, and about 30 IEDs to kill one foreign soldier. As happened in Iraq, the IED campaign is being defeated.
The high number of IEDs encountered is due to the fact for over a year, the foreign troops have been on the offensive, and more exposed to IED attacks in areas where there has not been time to clear out the IEDs. This is especially true with land mines, which are easier to plant and more difficult to avoid. The mines end up causing more civilian casualties as well, because the Taliban often don't remove the ones that did not go off, or mark the areas where they are.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/articles/20111010.aspx
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9.10.11
Armor For Smart Phones
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20111008.aspx
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8.10.11
Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet
A computer virus has infected the cockpits of America's Predator and Reaper drones, logging pilots' every keystroke as they remotely fly missions over Afghanistan and other warzones.
The virus, first detected nearly two weeks ago by the military's Host-Based Security System, has not prevented pilots at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada from flying their missions overseas. Nor have there been any confirmed incidents of classified information being lost or sent to an outside source. But the virus has resisted multiple efforts to remove it from Creech's computers, network security specialists say. And the infection underscores the ongoing security risks in what has become the U.S. military's most important weapons system.
"We keep wiping it off, and it keeps coming back," says a source familiar with the network infection, one of three that told Danger Room about the virus. "We think it's benign. But we just don't know."
Military network security specialists aren't sure whether the virus and its so-called "keylogger" payload were introduced intentionally or by accident; it may be a common piece of malware that just happened to make its way into these sensitive networks. The specialists don't know exactly how far the virus has spread. But they're sure that the infection has hit both classified and unclassified machines at Creech. That raises the possibility, at least, that secret data may have been captured by the keylogger, and then transmitted over the public internet to someone outside the military chain of command.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/virus-hits-drone-fleet/
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Surviving The Space Satellite Apocalypse
The U.S. Air Force believes China is developing the ability to carry out a major attack on American military satellites (the "satellite apocalypse"). Their proposed solution is to take GPS out of orbit, and make it portable. High flying aircraft, UAVs or blimps would take over satellite communications, surveillance and navigation (GPS) chores, although for smaller areas. This would make GPS, and other satellite functions, more resilient to attack.
This where the navy and the long endurance UAVs come in. There are several models in development. They all are similar in concept. They are lightweight, use solar panels to drive the electric motors day and night and power the communications relay or sensors (cameras and such) and fly at high altitudes (20,000-30,000 meters, above the weather).
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htspace/articles/20111006.aspx
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Brain Conditioning
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20111007.aspx
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Army Looks to Smart Phone for Nett Warrior
The Army has abandoned its decades-long effort to pack nearly 20 pounds of batteries, computer processors and displays on future Soldiers in favor of a simpler solution that uses technology already in many Joes' pockets.
Officials with Fort Belvoir, Va.-based PEO Soldier told reporters Oct. 6 that they had decided to configure the so-called "Nett Warrior" system to use a commercially available smart phone plugged into a secure tactical radio.
"There's significant cost and weight savings in this approach," said Nett Warrior deputy program manager Bill Brower. "We took out about 70 percent of the weight" from the original system.
In August, the Army said it was evaluating the future of Nett Warrior -- which included a wearable computer, GPS tracking unit, power supply and helmet-mounted head's up display -- to see if engineers could "infuse commercial devices and existing government devices into the program."
That effort coincided with the service's push to digitize its training and doctrine manuals and hand every new recruit a smart phone, such as an iPhone, to use for everything from navigation to professional education.
http://www.military.com/news/article/army-looks-to-smart-phone-for-nett-warrior.html?ESRC=eb.nl
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4.10.11
Sounds To Die For
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20111004.aspx
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Print The Myth
In the last decade, the mass media has been covering military matters much more intensively than they had in the previous decade. It showed, in the amount of misinformation and bad analysis that flowed from so many media outlets. As the old saying goes, when presented with the truth and the myth, print the myth. It gets more attention. These are some of the more misleading, but profitable, ones.
The Invasion of Iraq Was Illegal and Misguided. This was based on the failure to find Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Actually, several hundred chemical weapons were found, and Saddam had all his WMD scientists and technicians ready to produce more. Just end the sanctions and add money, and the weapons would be back in production within a year. At the time of the invasion, all intelligence agencies, world-wide, believed Saddam still had a functioning WMD program. Saddam had actually shut them down because of the cost, but created the illusion that the program was still operating in order to fool the Iranians. The Iranians wanted revenge on Saddam because of the Iraq invasion of Iran in 1980, and the eight year war that followed. Saddam himself admitted all this after he was captured. As for legality, the 2003 invasion was illegal only according to some in the UN. By that standard, the invasion of Kosovo and bombing of Serbia in 1999 was also illegal. Saddam was already at war with the U.S. and Britain, because Iraq had not carried out the terms of the 1991 ceasefire, and was trying to shoot down coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone.
The Invasion Was a Failure. This was a popular theme right up until the moment (three years ago), when it was obvious that it wasn't. Success came early and often. In 2003 Saddam's police state was overthrown and a democracy established, which was the objective of the operation. Peace did not ensue because Saddam's supporters, the Sunni Arab minority, were not willing to deal with majority rule, and war crimes trials. A terror campaign followed. Few expected the Sunni Arabs to be so stupid. There's a lesson to be learned there, but the mass media rarely discussed it. Another problem with this doom and gloom spin was a lack of analysis. If the war in Iraq was lost, by what measure was it lost? Saddam and his Baath party were out of power. There was a democratically elected government. Part of the Sunni Arab minority continued to support terror attacks, in an attempt to restore the Sunni Arab dictatorship. In response, extremist Shia Arabs formed vigilante death squads to expel all Sunni Arabs. Given the history of democracy in the Middle East, Iraq is working through its problems. Otherwise, one is to believe that the Arabs are incapable of democracy and only a tyrant like Saddam can make Iraq "work." If democracy were easy, the Arab states would all have it. There are problems, and solutions have to be found and implemented. That takes time, but Americans have, since the 18th century, grown weary of wars after a few years. If the war goes on longer, the politicians have to scramble to survive the bad press and opinion polls. Opposition politicians take advantage of the situation, but this has nothing to do with Iraq, and everything to do with local politics in the United States.
The U.S. Needed More Soldiers. Not according to the generals, who knew that in the time it took to recruit and train a lot of new troops, you could fight smart (the preferred way by the professionals) and win the war. Moreover, most journalists, in addition to ignoring (or being ignorant of) the years it takes to produce capable troops, played down the fact that the army lost a third of its strength in the 1990s, as part of the peace dividend from the end of the Cold War. The media also ignored the army and marine doctrine of training and using locals to maintain order. Trying to use Americans to do it is very inefficient. The troops knew that, the reporters ignored it. The media also played down the logistical problems of supporting troops in landlocked (and generally roadless) Afghanistan. The Russians were unable to maintain more than 150,000 troops in Afghanistan, and the U.S. is up against the same constraints. At the same time, Afghanistan has never been a country, as the concept is understood in the West. The army Special Forces understood this, as did the generals they worked for. But the media hardly ever touched this issue.
The Invasion Helped Al Qaeda. Compared to what? Al Qaeda was a growing movement before 2003, and before 2001. But after the Iraq invasion, and especially the Sunni Arab terrorism, al Qaeda fell in popularity throughout the Moslem world. Arab countries cracked down on al Qaeda operations more than ever before. Without the Iraq invasion, al Qaeda would still have safe havens all over the Arab world. Another angle here was that the Iraq War caused Islamic terrorism to increase in Europe. The Moslem unrest in Europe was there before 2001, and 2003. Interviews of Islamic radicals in Europe reveals that the hatred is not motivated by Iraq, but by daily encounters with hostile natives. Blaming this Islamic terrorism on Iraq is another attempt to avoid dealing with a homegrown problem.
The U.S. Did Not Work With Locals. American troops went into Iraq and Afghanistan with a centuries old tradition of "working with the locals." The U.S. Army had over 20,000 Special Forces and Civil Affairs troops, whose primary job was to work with the locals. The marines were still using their "Small Wars Manual", which was written in 1940, based on four decades of marine peacekeeping operations. Soldiers, and even State Department officials, used this manual, to good effect. But the way the news business works, problems in this area gets much more attention than the more numerous successes. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the basic idea was what it has always been. That is, help the locals establish a new government and create a new security force. In Iraq, you first had to defeat the Saddam and Islamic terrorists who were desperate to return the country to dictatorship (either secular, in the case of the Saddam supporters, or religious, in the case of al Qaeda and their ilk.)
Iraqis Were Better Off Under Saddam. Most Iraqis disagree. Check election results and opinion polls. Reporters tend to ask Iraqi Sunni Arabs this question, but they were the only ones who benefited from Saddam's rule.
Too Many Contractors In The Combat Zone. [RTO Trainer--Can't agree with this one--it lays out the facts well enough, but still kicks off with a naked assertion in the first sentence. When I'm no longer deployed, I'll address this topic in depth.] There weren't. The large number of contractors was the product of several trends. First, there was a lot more technology in use, and it had to be maintained. Second, conscription had eliminated a major source of cheap labor for a lot of these support jobs. So, over the last half century, there have been a growing number of civilian contractors. In 2008, there was one civilian contractor for each member of the U.S. military in Iraq. Thus half the American force was civilians. This is not the first time this has happened. In the 1990s, half the American peacekeeping force in the Balkans was civilian contractors. In past wars, the percentage varied. During the 1991 Gulf war, contractors were only about two percent of the force. That was because the U.S. troops came to liberate Kuwait and leave. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States, had bases they allowed U.S. forces to use for the operation. The American troops basically lived "in the field" as they would in a conventional war. In the Vietnam War, where U.S. troops were there for a long time, contractors were 16 percent of the force. In the Korean War, civilians were 28 percent of the force. During World War II it was 12 percent, it was 4 percent in World War I. During the U.S. Civil War it was 17 percent, during the Mexican-American War it was 15 percent and during the Revolutionary War, it was 18 percent. Another misreported contractor story had to do with the 15 percent of them who were used for security chores. These guys were often described as "out of control." They weren't. Nearly all of them were former military or police, and the ones accused of being the most trigger happy were the ones who had to go into the most dangerous areas. Blackwater recruited most of these. One of the Blackwater contracts was for the U.S. State Department. This was very successful, as not a single State Department employee was killed, no matter how dangerous was the area Blackwater escorted them through, and how energetically terrorists tried to kill the diplomatic personnel.
The Three Year Rule. In all of America's wars, popular support for the war effort sharply declined after three years. Even though the U.S. government said, from late September, 2001 on, that the war on terror would be a long one, this has not changed the impact of the Three Year War. If you can't get it over with within three years, you are going to face more and more voter opposition to the war effort. Go back and look at the history of all of America's long (over three years) wars and you will see this play out. It happened in the war on terror, and the various theaters of conflict (notably Afghanistan and Iraq.) This led ambitious politicians to declare deadlines, which makes life a lot more difficult for American combat commanders, and encourages the enemy no end.
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Peace As A Weapon
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/israel/articles/20111004.aspx
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3.10.11
And Live Islamically Ever After II
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20111003.aspx
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And Live Islamically Ever After
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20111003.aspx
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The Decline Of The IED
In Afghanistan...IEDs are more frequently used against troops on foot patrol. These, more than attacks on vehicles, tend to cause multiple fatalities. In Afghanistan, the enemy also uses more land mines, both against troops and larger ones against vehicles travelling the numerous dirt roads.
The Taliban, unable to withstand foreign troops in a gun battle, have put most of their resources into an IED campaign. Thus the number of IEDs encountered went from 2,678 in 2007 to than 12,000 last year. This year, the number is declining.
In Afghanistan foreign troops have been on the offensive this year, and more exposed to IED attacks in areas where there has not been time to clear out the IEDs. This is especially true with land mines, which are easier to plant and more difficult to avoid. The mines end up causing more civilian casualties as well, because the Taliban often don't remove the ones that did not go off, or mark the areas where they are. If foreign troops do not encounter mines, and thus have an opportunity to clear them, civilians will eventually encounter them and get hurt.
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